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Why industrial policy becomes again 
fashionable?
• Two explanations:
• From a political viewpoint: delocalisation, 
deindustrialisation, jobs destruction revived a 
demand for industrial policy intervention
• From a theoretical viewpoint: globalisation, 
increasing competition reduce the time and 
the margin firms have to gather the 
necessary information and mobilise the 
required resources
What kind of policy do firms need?
• There are two types of industrial policies: 
Sector-based policies and horizontal policies
• Sector-based policies are policies, aimed at 
protecting sectors (and firms) from market 
forces and current competition.
• They consist in entry barriers, trade barriers, 
employment subsidies or import- substitution 
policies
What kind of policy do firms need?
• Horizontal policies correspond to a broader 
interpretation of industrial policy
• They are aimed at supporting firms engaged 
in competition on free markets, and favouring 
market selection
• They include anti-trust and regulation policies, 
but also supply-side policies that are 
concerned with the labour and the financial 
markets
What kind of policy do firms need?
• Two questions are to be answered
• Is it true that horizontal policies are more 
efficient than sector-based policies?
• Which horizontal policies do we need? That 
is, with which objectives and by which 
channels?
In what follows
• We will show that most limitations invoked against 
sector-based policies hold for horizontal policies
• We will show that barriers to growth are the main 
problem to be faced by firms 
• Then, a new analytical framework will be 
contemplated that focuses on the information issues 
associated with the growth process of firms
• And both objectives and channels of industrial policy 
will be revisited
• Finally, situation in France will be contrasted with that 
of Germany
Industrial policies: which 
deficiencies
• According to the standard theory, market 
failures must be eliminated or compensated: 
they open the way for public intervention
• Thus, how government ought to intervene 
depends on the characteristics of the industry 
(technology, preferences, information)
• But these characteristics are not really known 
by policy makers
• As a consequence many subsidies could be 
inefficient, when they do not turn into waste
Industrial policies: which 
deficiencies
• This is true, by definition, for sector-based policies. 
This is also true for some horizontal policies
• Fixing R&D subsidies requires to know the real 
content of knowledge spillovers
• Subsidising human capital accumulation requires to 
know the market failures that affect the training of 
human capital 
• Reducing the gap between the existing market 
structure and the optimal one, requires to precisely 
identify the former
Industrial policies: which 
deficiencies
• Therefore, the only eligible policy is the policy that 
focuses on the working of markets and consists in 
reforms that liberalise these markets
• This option is questionable: believing that full 
competition might be a benchmark is a dangerous 
obsession, which may also turn into waste
• Facilitate the working of market forces is not the 
same thing that looking for the conditions of full 
(perfect) competition
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• Recent literature focuses on the incentives to 
innovate, which would be determined by the nature 
and the strength of the barriers to entry
• If we look at data about the rate of entry, the rate of 
exit, and the rate of turnover, there is no evidence 
that such obstacles really exist
• Thus, the rate of turnover is higher in France than in 
Germany, particularly in manufacturing, and more or 
less the same as in the US 
Source Bartelsman et alii 2005
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Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• There are no large differences in firm 
turnover among countries once account is 
taken of differences in sector composition, 
• There are no large differences in firms rate of 
survival after 7 years
• But, post-entry growth of survivors is much 
stronger in some countries than in other ones
Source Bartelsman et alii 2005
Source Bartelsman et alii 2005
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• Barriers to growth might be more 
significant than barriers to entry in 
explaining difference in performances 
across countries
• Ability to invest and grow might be 
much more decisive than incentives to 
create a new firm and enter the market
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• Some analytical and empirical studies 
show that these barriers could be 
attributed to the existence of sunk costs 
and to the resource constraints 
associated with them
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• The combination of sunk costs in setting-up a 
new business and high uncertainty leads 
firms to start small and to expand once they 
are established
• Thus, some firms are small because they are 
financially constrained, while in a later phase, 
if financial constraints cease to be binding, 
these firms will grow to their optimal size.
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• Thus, in the case of French manufacturing 
firms, financial constraints significantly 
increase the probability of exiting the market, 
• and access to external financial resources 
has a positive effect on the growth of firms
• But financial constraints are positively 
correlated with productivity growth in the 
short run.
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• It is also worth mentioning that the 
productivity path of French manufacturing 
firms that enter export markets is U shaped:
• Total factor productivity decreases prior to 
entry to the extent it inverts the ranking in 
performances of exporting and non exporting 
firm
• This U shaped path reveals both the 
existence of sunk costs (resources 
constraints) and what happens when they are 
removed
Source: Bellone et alii 2007
Industrial issues: which 
evidence
• On the one hand, financial constraints must 
not be too high: they must allow firms growing
• On the other hand, they must be enough 
tight, and discipline competition among firms
• In any case, what is at stake is reducing the 
barriers to growth, in fact the barriers to 
converge towards a sort of natural market 
structure, which allow firms capturing 
productivity gains
Industrial change: a new 
analytical framework
• While main discussions in I.O. consist in 
determining the outcomes, which correspond 
to different information structures, the real 
issue is to identify how firms may have an 
access to the relevant market information.
• In fact, firms are not only concerned with 
incentives in industries characterised by a full 
co-ordination on a good or bad equilibrium; 
they have to face co-ordination failures, in 
fact, market imbalances and resources 
constraints
The nature of the problem
• A specific co-ordination problem is involved 
due to the existence of two delays
• On the one hand, investment represents a 
firm commitment, and this commitment give 
rise to an additional output only after a certain 
interval of time elapsed
• On the other hand, entrepreneurs will learn 
about the commitments of others, and also 
about the needs of customers only after a 
certain period of time
The solution of the problem
• Dealing with these two delays require 
specific means of co-ordination.
• The co-existence of a number of firms, 
each producing under increasing 
returns, depend on the existence of 
market connections, that is, on market 
imperfections that are in the nature of 
the competition process.
The need of restrictive 
practices
• Thus, co-ordination through market 
transactions is only possible by virtue of 
existence of circumstances which set bounds 
to what happen, in particular to investment 
behaviours.
• This is provided by natural or contrived 
restraints, which permit industry converging 
towards a dynamic equilibrium,in fact a 
coordinated state
• and which orientate instruments and objective 
of industrial policies.
Natural and contrived 
restraints
• There are natural restraints: indeed, the differences 
among firms in the ability either to foresee a profit 
opportunity or to increase production in response to it
• There are contrived restraints: indeed, agreements 
between firms that compete with each other or 
between firms and their customers
• Typically R&D agreements that allow firms sharing 
heavy costs, but also and mainly sharing the market 
information, which is made available only step by 
step, with the effect of coordinating competitive 
investments
What about the market 
discipline?
• All these restraints may appear as incompatible with 
market discipline, which is supposed to prevent firms 
to reduce investment and production, and to maintain 
a rate of profit in excess of the normal level.
• Nevertheless, performance should be a guide, only if 
assessed over a period long enough for the influence 
of sunk costs to be taken into account.
• All these restraints can be qualified as market 
failures, but only from a static viewpoint. From a 
dynamic viewpoint, we have to distinguish between 
those that help co-ordination and those that are really 
harmful.
Towards a natural market 
structure
• Firms’ growth depend on the behaviour of their 
competitors as well as their suppliers and customers
• Firms growth strategies will be successful when 
investments will be coordinated, that is when a sort of 
natural market structure will be stabilised.
• Stabilisation means that market imbalances are 
dampened, and both competitive and complementary 
investments are made compatible with each other.
Towards a natural market 
structure
• This is a situation in which competition causes the 
rate of investment in product development  to rise or 
fall towards the level at which this investment yields 
only a normal return
• This is a situation in which entries and exits do not 
change the market structure, and look like a purely 
random phenomenon.
• This is a situation that corresponds to dynamic 
efficiency, and a well managed process of creative 
destruction.
Towards a natural market 
structure
• A plurality of firms that compete with each other is 
certainly the best situation both for firms and 
customers
• But, a dynamic equilibrium has nothing to do with 
perfect competition
• It may be considered as corresponding to a natural 
market structure in the sense that it allows firms 
capturing all the potential gains of productivity.
• The characteristics of this structure are essentially 
unknown. They will be the result of the rivalry 
between firms under specific specific restraints
Which objective for policy 
makers
• As a consequence, policy cannot be devoted 
at reducing the gap between the existing 
market structure and this entirely unknown 
structure.
• It must be devoted at establishing these 
conditions that favour the convergence 
towards the so-called dynamic equilibrium, 
which are not, in any way, the full competition 
conditions
Industrial policy revisited
• Policies oriented to ameliorate industry performances 
must be aimed at giving more market information to 
firms, at creating a more stable environment for them, 
and then should help industries converging towards a 
dynamic equilibrium.
• Of course, government has not more information than 
the firms about markets and technologies.
• But it has not the same constraints and the same 
objectives. Its intervention may allow firms acquiring 
more information about market conditions, and 
helping them to innovate and grow.
Industrial policy revisited
• Rather than to be sector or technology based per se, 
industrial policy must be an array of horizontal 
interventions that target the relations between firms, 
between firms and their employees, between firms 
and financial intermediaries, between firms and 
public research institutions
• Subsidies must not devoted at supporting national 
champions or high tech sectors, but at encouraging 
cooperation among firms, including firms that 
compete with each other.
Competition and industrial 
policy
• Competition plays a central role in the coordination 
process.
• But, it is not only aimed at equalising supply and 
demand in a given environment. It has also to adapt 
both structure and and technology to fresh 
opportunities created by expanding markets
• Therefore, competition policy cannot be conducted 
without considering the distortions that are in the 
nature of the growth process, and the necessity of 
agreeing with some market connections or 
imperfections.
Competition and industrial 
policy
• However, policy makers may be faced with a real 
dilemma
• On the one hand, market connections help firms to 
invest and innovate. On the other hand, these 
arrangements can be used to shelter inefficiency or 
extract undue profits
• To rule that all restraints are against the public 
interest per se denies the existence of the dilemma
Competition and industrial 
policy
• Market imperfections are necessary to convince firms 
to carry out innovative investment and, as such, they 
are not something to be systematically condemned.
• Competition and regulation policies have to take into 
account the possible divorce between static and 
dynamic efficiency, and support restrictive practices 
that enhance innovation and growth
• As industrial policies, they must be discretionary
policies rather than to be reduced to the enforcement 
of given rules.
Labour markets and industrial 
policies
• The prevailing view is that the possibility of hiring and 
firing freely, and offering wages at a freely chosen 
level, is an incentive to invest and hence to favour 
innovation and growth.
• The argument is that the higher levels of productivity 
are obtained by firms operating in high tech sectors 
and that these sectors are characterised by strong 
rates of creation and destruction of jobs
• Dismissal costs (employment protection) would 
reduce incentive to invest
Labour markets and industrial 
policies
• However, because it increases job tenure and, 
through this channel, favours on the job training, 
employment protection also affects human capital 
accumulation, and hence productivity
• Thus labour markets policies, far from being oriented 
to the dismantlement of the welfare state, should 
promote creation of skills through forms of bargaining 
between employers and employees that help 
adaptation to technological and market changes. 
Regional and industrial 
policies
• Industrial policies have a territorial dimension insofar 
as there are local learning processes; they have to 
promote the development of clusters
• But local governments are not better informed than 
the national government, can also be easily captured 
by lobbyists, and have not a higher degree of 
competences
• Moreover, competition among regions can be 
wasteful, enhancing inequalities and affecting global 
efficiency
Regional and industrial 
policies
• We can make the conjecture that the smaller is the 
region size, the more wasteful competition among 
them will be. 
• This might be because small regions are more 
inclined to compete with each other by promoting 
generic advantages  such as tax reductions or set-up 
subsidies, which reduce the sunk costs but make 
setting-ups more instable
• While larger regions would be more inclined to 
promote cooperation between firms within and 
outside the territory, and to pay subsidies, aimed at 
sustaining large public programmes such as 
environmental programmes
France and Germany
• During the nineties, in manufacturing sector, the total 
firm turnover (entry + exit) is about 3% in Germany 
while it is about 11% in France
• Moreover, firm exit outpaced firm entry in France (6.5 
against 4.5%) while a balanced pattern is found in 
Germany
• Entry and exit are positively correlated in Germany 
while negatively correlated in France 
• The export participation rate is lower (44% against 
72%) and mean export intensity greater (40% against 
21%) in Germany than in France
Figu re B  
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France versus Germany
• This shows that market structures are 
stabilised and investments coordinated in 
Germany, while turbulences persist in France
• This also shows that, in France, there are no 
barriers to entry e.g. in export market, but 
stronger barriers to growth on these markets, 
which is the main difference with Germany
France and Germany
• If we look at the orientation of industrial policies in 
each country, strong differences can be observed
• The state aid as a percentage of x100 GDP is much 
more important in Germany than in France (54.4 
against 33.5 for horizontal objectives; 90.5 against 
56.4 for the total less railways); 
• And is more oriented to environment (31.7 against 
0.6), and regional aid (11.8 against 6.3), less oriented 
to employment (0.6 against 6.7), R&D (6.7 against 
8.0), and SME (2.0 against 7.9).

France and Germany
• Both environment and regional aids are aimed at 
creating market information and market conditions 
that help firm to invest by reducing uncertainty.
• By the way, the successful areas of German 
economy are successful because they do not have 
flexible labour markets in the conventional sense
• France has not elaborated a fully coherent industrial 
policy framework
• The nature of aid and the size of regions are the main 
differences between the two countries
In guise of conclusion
• Industrial policies should be horizontal
• But instead of replicating or re-establishing the 
conditions of full (perfect) competition, they should be 
aimed at validating restraints that allow firms 
acquiring market information.
• This implies privileging subsidies aimed at supporting 
cooperation between the various actors of innovation 
processes through large public programmes defined 
at appropriate geographic levels, that is, levels that 
permit avoiding a destructive competition among 
regions or countries.
